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Abstract:	 Community	 forestry	 or	 social	 forestry	 (henceforth	 referred	 collectively	 as	 SF)	 programs	 have	
become	new	modes	of	forest	management	empowering	local	managers	and	hence,	allowing	integration	of	
diverse	local	practices	and	support	of	local	livelihoods.	 	 Implementation	of	these	initiatives,	however,	face	
multiple	 challenges.	 State-prescribed	 community	 programs,	 for	 example,	 will	 remain	 isolated	 efforts	 if	
changes	 in	the	overall	economic	and	social	governance	frameworks,	 including	the	devolution	of	rights	to	
local	users	is	lacking.	Financial	sustainability	of	these	measures	remains	often	uncertain	and	equity	issues	
inherent	to	groups	and	communities	formed	for	SF,	can	be	exacerbated.	In	this	article,	we	pose	the	question:	
Whose	interests	do	SF	policies	serve?	The	effectiveness	of	SF	would	depend	on	the	motivations	and	aims	for	
a	decentralization	of	forest	governance	to	the	community.	In	order	to	understand	the	underlying	motivations	
behind	the	governments’	push	for	SF,	we	examine	national	policies	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia,	changes	in	
their	policies	over	time	and	the	shift	in	discourses	influencing	how	SF	has	evolved.	Vietnam	and	Indonesia	
are	 at	 different	 sides	 of	 the	 spectrum	 in	 democratic	 ambitions	 and	 forest	 abundance,	 and	 present	 an	
intriguing	comparison	in	the	recent	regional	push	towards	SF	in	Southeast	Asia.	 	 We	discuss	the	different	
interpretations	of	SF	in	these	two	countries	and	how	SF	programs	are	implemented.	Our	results	show	that	
governments,	influenced	by	global	discourse,	are	attempting	to	regulate	SF	through	formal	definitions	and	
regulations.	 	 Communities	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 might	 resist	 by	 adopting,	 adapting	 or	 rejecting	 formal	
schemes.	 	 In	this	tension,	SF,	adopted	to	serve	the	interest	of	local	people,	in	practice	has	not	fulfilled	its	
promise.	
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1.	Introduction	
Throughout	 Southeast	 Asia,	 some	 140	 million	 people	 are	 dependent	 on	 forests	 for	 their	
livelihoods	 and	 have	 developed	 their	 own	 systems	 of	 managing	 resources	 based	 on	 traditional	
knowledge,	 practices,	 rules	 and	 beliefs	 for	 generations	 (‘customary	 use’)	 (Chao,	 2012).	 	 The	
Vietnam	Forest	Administration	(VNFOREST)	estimated	that	in	2008,	around	247,030	ha	of	forestland	
were	managed	in	a	traditional	way	without	legal	title	in	Vietnam	(Nguyen,	2009;	Sikor	and	Nguyen,	
2011).	Of	this,	175,395	ha	is	forest	and	71,634	ha	is	bare	land.	In	Indonesia,	1,500	villages	with	an	
area	of	more	than	11	million	ha	are	located	within	the	state	forest	area,	supporting	80	to	95	million	
people	(Ministry	of	Forestry	and	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2009)	and	many	more	live	in	areas	bordering	
forest.	 	 	
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These	millions	of	people	developed	forest	practices	according	to	local	conditions	and	culture,	
supported	 by	 local	 governance	 structures	 that	 have	 been	 effective	 in	 maintaining	 forest	 and	
providing	 local	 livelihoods.	 	 Yet	 these	 practices	 and	 structures	 are	 often	 invisible	 to	 the	 State,	
beyond	state	control	and	or	simply	ignored	(Scott,	1998;	Soriaga	and	Walpole,	2006).	 	 At	the	same	
time,	people	may	choose	to	be	at	the	forest	margins	(or	the	periphery)	to	avoid	State	control	such	
as	the	administration	of	taxes	or	land	control	(Scott,	2009).	When	States	claimed	rights	and	control	
over	the	forest,	people	in	remote	forested	areas	continued	practicing	traditional	ways	of	forest	and	
land	use	(Arnold,	2001),	while	at	the	same	time	incorporating	and	adapting	with	the	overall	political	
and	economic	system	of	the	State	(Scott,	2009;	Herriman	and	Winarnita,	2016).	Today,	people	in	
these	areas	are	also	the	main	target	for	the	latest	drive	of	formal	state	structured	social	forestry	
development.	
Community	 Forestry	 or	 Social	 Forestry	 emerged	 in	 the	 late	 1970s,	 when	 concern	 over	
increasing	deforestation	 rates	 led	 to	a	questioning	of	 state	 control	over	 forest	 resources	and	 its	
capacity	to	effectively	protect	and	manage	forests	sustainably.	 	 Social	or	Community	Forestry	was	
seen	as	an	alternative	to	solving	forest	management	problems	(Gilmour,	2016),	and	forest	conflicts	
(Purnomo	 and	 Anand,	 2014).	 	 Over	 time,	 ideas	 of	 democracy	 and	 justice	 (Brosius	 et	 al.	 1998;	
Larson,	 2005),	 coupled	 with	 neo-liberal	 ideas	 (McCarthy,	 2005)	 and	 increasing	 evidence	 that	
traditional	practices	can	achieve	positive	outcomes	for	conservation	(Chomba	et	al.,	2015)	shaped	
how	community	forestry	and	social	forestry	programs	developed	in	different	countries.	 	 	 	
Although	definitions	vary,	here	we	use	both	Community	Forestry	and	Social	Forestry,	denoted	
as	SF,	to	mean	“any	situation	which	intimately	involves	local	people	in	a	forestry	activity”	(Arnold,	
1992).	 	 We	follow	an	accepted	understanding	that	SF	includes	both:	(1)	the	use	of	forest	resources	
by	 local	 people,	 on	 an	 individual	 or	 household	 basis,	 for	 consumption	 and	 sale;	 and	 (2)	 the	
community	management	of	forests,	which	refers	to	a	collaborative	enterprise	conducted	by	a	group	
of	local	people	who	manage	forests	either	independently	or	with	outside	support	for	the	production	
of	resources	for	consumption	and	sale	(RECOFTC,	ASFN	and	SDC,	2010).	 	
Vietnam	 and	 Indonesia	 are	 two	 countries	 experimenting	 with	 decentralization,	 including	
devolution	of	forestland	to	communities	through	SF	as	part	of	the	state	regulatory	framework.	As	
part	of	the	CIFOR	project	ASEAN-Swiss	Partnership	on	Social	Forestry	and	Climate	Change	(ASFCC),	
the	 two	 countries	 provide	 an	 interesting	 comparison	 given	 their	 rather	 different	 histories	 of	
democracy	 and	 levels	 of	 forest	 abundance	 and	 pressures.	 	 Implementation	 and	 outcomes,	
however,	have	been	disappointing	 in	the	sense	that	devolution	has	not	 included	the	full	suite	of	
rights	to	accompany	the	responsibilities	of	forest	management	(Maryudi,	2012;	Maryudi	et	al.,	2012;	
RECOFTC	2014;	Chomba	et	al.,	2014;	Chomba	et	al.,	2015;	Gilmour,	2016;	Schusser	et	al.,	2015).	 	 	
We	ask	the	question:	whose	interests	do	SF	serve?	Understanding	the	effectiveness	of	SF	would	
first	require	clarity	on	the	underlying	motivations	of	governments	in	adopting	SF,	which	would	then	
allow	for	a	proper	assessment	of	how	SF	policies	are	implemented.	In	this	article,	we	apply	the	4I	
(institutions,	 interests,	 ideas,	 and	 information	 framework)	 by	Brockhaus	 and	Angelsen	 (2012)	 to	
analyze	the	underlying	power	relations,	economic	incentives	and	discursive	practices.	We	examine	
and	compare	the	national	policies	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia,	changes	in	policies	over	time	and	shifts	
in	discourses	to	see	how	SF	has	evolved,	been	interpreted	and	implemented	in	these	two	countries.	
2.	Social	Forestry	discourse	and	evolution	
Over	 the	 more	 than	 40	 years	 of	 social/community	 forestry	 development,	 different	
interpretations	of	SF	have	emerged,	often	influenced	by	different	global	discourses	and	often	not	
well	adjusted	to	the	local	contexts.	 	 Understandings	of,	and	perspectives	on	SF	evolved	from	seeing	
local	people	as	the	problem	in	driving	deforestation	and	degradation	to	local	people	as	the	solution,	
from	local	people	being	‘allowed’	to	participate	in	forest	management	towards	a	local	governance	
approach	where	the	management	of	forests	are	fully	devolved	to	local	communities.	Though	State	
motivations	for	SF	might	differ,	and	ideas	of	justice	are	rather	absent	in	these,	the	spirit	of	SF	has	
been	one	of	devolution	and	democratization.	 	
Though	 different	 discourses	 emerged	 at	 different	 points	 of	 time,	 core	 elements	 in	 these	
discourses	with	regard	to	problem	definition,	 identified	appropriate	policy	responses	and	overall	
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objectives	of	SF	remain	surprisingly	constant	over	time.	 	 One	dominant	narrative	since	the	1970s	
is	SF	as	a	solution	for	poverty,	which	emerged	at	the	same	time	as	the	shift	in	development	discourse	
where	rural	people	were	considered	'poor’	and	development	was	aimed	to	fulfill	their	‘basic	needs’	
(Pollock,	1973	Streeten,	1981;	Todaro	and	Smith,	2012).	Discourses	on	SF	further	include	ideas	such	
as	 devolution	 and	 restoration	 of	 rights;	 better	 governance;	 development	 of	 entrepreneurship	
(RECOFTC,	ASFN	and	SDC,	2010;	Sam	and	Shepard,	2011;	de	Jong,	2012);	empowerment	(Maryudi,	
2012;	Maryudi	et	al.,	2012;	RECOFTC,	2014);	a	mechanism	for	reducing	the	fiscal	burden	of	the	state;	
or	improving	management	of	natural	resources	through	applying	local	knowledge	(Meinzen-Dick	et	
al.,	 2008;	 Arnold,	 2001).	 This	 mix	 of	 discourses	 and	 rationales	 has	 been	 adopted	 by	 most	
governments	of	Southeast	Asia	and	applied	in	various	forms	and	using	different	terms:	community	
forestry,	 participatory	 forestry,	 village	 forestry,	 community	 based	 forest	 management	 or	 social	
forestry.	 	 	
	
Table	1.	Discourse	on	community	forestry	according	to	De	Jong	(2012)	
Discourse	 Description	
Forest	resource	
scarcity	CF	discourse	
- Initiated	by	FAO	
- Focus:	the	perceived	danger	of	forest	resource	scarcity	resulting	from	
unsustainable	use	would	lead	to	a	decline	in	rural	welfare.	Limited	local	
resources	seen	as	a	constraint	in	fulfilling	basic	needs.	
- Implication:	shift	focus	within	development	concept/agenda	toward	rural	
population	and	agriculture	and	to	meeting	the	‘basic	needs’	of	rural	dwellers.	
Projects	are	aimed	to	reforestation	and	afforestation.	 	
Forest	conservation	
CF	discourse	
- Initiated	by	conservation	NGOs	
- Focus:	Deforestation	as	a	worldwide	issue	needs	to	be	halted,	and	‘community	
forest	management	through	sustained	harvesting	and	sales	of	NTFP	is	a	more	
profitable	use	of	tropical	forests	and	at	the	same	time	contributes	to	tropical	
forest	conservation’.	
- Implication:	conservation-development	projects	working	with	communities	to	
identify	marketable	NTFPs	and	establish	the	related	value	chain.	
Community	
enterprise	CF	
discourse	
- Development	cooperation,	forestry	agencies	and	rural	development	NGOs.	
- Focus:	CF	as	an	abstract	objective	of	communities	who	manage	forest	estates,	
mostly	to	produce	forest	commodities.	
- Implication:	promotion	of	CF	enterprise	following	the	western	enterprise	models	
with	their	related	hierarchy	and	business	management	approach.	Forest	
management	is	manifested	in	forest	management	plans	and	annual	operation	
plans	that	are	prepared	according	to	legally	prescribed	norms.	 	 	 		
While	SF	is	diverse,	governments	define	three	main	objectives:	1)	to	alleviate	poverty	of	forest	
dependent	 people,	 2)	 to	 enable	 communities	 to	 have	 secure	 access	 to,	 and	 ownership	 of,	 the	
resources	 and	 their	 benefits,	 through	 empowerment	 and	 building	 of	 capacity	 for	 forest	
management,	 and	 3)	 to	 improve	 the	 condition	 of	 forests	 (Blaikie,	 2006;	 Maryudi	 et	 al.,	 2012;	
Chomba	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Gilmour,	 2016).	 	 Reconciling	 these	 multiple	 objectives	 of	 conservation,	
livelihoods,	and	governance	expected	from	SF	can	be	daunting.	In	many	cases,	conservation	goals	
were	attained	at	the	expense	of	local	empowerment,	showing	that	the	three	objectives	might	not	
necessarily	mutually	 reinforce	one	another	 (Kellert	et	al.,	2000;	Arnold,	2001;	Ribot	et	al.,	2010;	
Chomba	et	al.,	2015).	
Empowerment	appears	to	be	the	most	challenging.	 	 Empowerment	implies	that	local	forest	
users	and/or	forest	dependent	communities	have	autonomy	in	setting	objectives,	local	control	in	
forest	management	and	utilization,	and	ownership	of	the	benefits	of	the	forest	(Kellert	et	al.,	2000;	
Blaikie,	2006).	 	 It	 therefore	also	 implies	the	right	to	control	the	use	of	 forestland	and	resources	
within	 their	 jurisdictions.	 Yet,	 empowerment	 or	 devolution	 of	 power	 is	 constrained	 by	 conflicts	
between	state	and	communities	to	gain	control	over	forestland	and	resources.	 	 Adiwibowo	et	al.	
(2016)	uses	the	term	‘contested	devolution’	in	which	access	and	control	over	the	forests	and	ensuing	
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benefits	are	reformulated	within	the	interaction	and	negotiation	process	among	parties	concerned	
as	 they	 are	 implemented.	 The	 adoption	 of	 neo-liberalism	 (McCarthy,	 2005)	 further	 drives	 the	
discourse	that	in	order	to	alleviate	poverty,	SF	needs	to	be	managed	as	a	business	enterprise	(De	
Jong	 2012),	 thereby	 reducing	 forests	 and	 forest	 resources	 to	 a	 commodity.	 During	 processes	 of	
devolution,	 negotiation	 and	 change,	 local	 elites	 have	 frequently	 managed	 to	 grab	 control	 over	
benefits	at	the	expense	of	broader	community	interests	(Maryudi	et	al.,	2012;	Schusser	et	al.,	2015).	
There	appears	to	be	a	disconnect	between	the	“spirit”	of	SF	and	the	policies	–	is	SF	really	meant	
to	be	a	devolution	of	rights	for	local	empowerment	and	management	of	forests?	 	 Or,	as	Maryudi	
(2012)	claims,	a	way	for	the	State	and	or	timber	companies	to	regain	control?	Whose	interests	do	
SF	policies	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia	serve?	To	study	these	questions,	we	adopt	the	4I-	Institutions,	
Ideas,	Interest	and	Information-	framework	(Brockhaus	and	Angelsen,	2012),	which	aims	to	explain	
how	these	factors	interact	and	contribute	or	actually	hinder	major	policy	changes	across	multiple	
levels	of	governance,	with	a	multitude	of	actors	and	often	conflicting	politico-economic	 interests	
and	objectives.	The	first	I	refers	to	the	institutions	within	a	particular	policy	arena,	described	as	the	
norms,	 regulations,	 and	 formal	 and	 informal	 arrangements	 which	 have	 shaped	 the	 policies.	
Stickiness	 of	 particular	 rules	 that	 aim	 to	 govern	 land	 and	 land	 use	 practices	 and	 persistence	 of	
existing	arrangements,	despite	new	and	emerging	evidence	can	often	be	attributed	to	those	actors	
with	most	power	and	an	interest	in	maintaining	the	status	quo.	A	second	I	is	related	to	interests,	
and	while	Brockhaus	and	Angelsen	(2012)	refer	to	this	I	as	material,	we	would	like	to	stress	here	
also	 non-material	 interests,	 shaped	 by	 culture	 and	 tradition	 which	 are	 also	 highly	 relevant	 to	
SF.		 This	links	to	the	third	I,	Ideas,	which	refers	to	ideologies,	political	beliefs,	and	mental	models,	
and	in	fact	builds	on	the	other	two	I’s	by	highlighting	the	particular	role	of	discourses	to	frame	and	
shape	policy	actors’	perceptions	of	policy	problems	and	what	 is	perceived	as	a	solution.	 Ideas	or	
ideology	 are	 important	 as	 what	 actors	 believe	 might	 be	 just	 as	 important	 as	 what	 they	 want	
(Vanberg	and	Buchanan,	1989	quoted	in	Campbell,	2002).	Discourses	and	particular	ideas	of	actors	
are	also	linked	to	the	information	available,	the	fourth	I	in	the	framework,	and	how	and	by	whom	
facts	are	selected,	interpreted	and	reinterpreted.		 	
Applying	these	4	I’s	allows	us	to	capture	the	political	economy	context	of	social	forestry	in	South	
East	Asia,	which	often	gets	overlooked	in	literature.	 	 With	this	framework	we	can	explain	whose	
interests	and	ideas	in	an	existing	institutional	context	are	reflected	in	final	decisions	over	design	and	
implementation	of	SF	and	what	this	would	mean	for	the	possibility	of	change	in	the	wider	policy	
arena.	 	
3.	Methods	  
In	our	analysis	we	focus	mainly	on	three	of	the	4Is,	institutions,	interests	and	discourses	(ideas)	
and	we	operationalized	 the	4	 Is	 framework	 in	our	study	 through	a	mix	of	methods,	 in	particular	
policy	content	analysis,	literature	review,	semi-structured	interviews	between	2012	and	2016,	and	
participatory	observation.	 	
In	analyzing	the	main	current	social	forestry	policy	documents	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia	we	
focused	on	how	SF	is	defined	and	regulated,	by	whom.	This	gave	us	insights	in	the	institutions-I	and,	
by	looking	at	policy	changes	over	time,	provided	information	on	diverse	interests	and	underlying	
power	relations.	Linking	this	to	literature,	we	analysed	how	broader	discourses	around	forestry	have	
influenced	and	driven	diverse	forms	of	social	and	community	forestry	in	the	two	countries.	We	then	
explored	to	what	extent	Vietnam	and	Indonesia	have	reconciled	the	interests	of	the	government	in	
terms	of	control	with	a	rights	based	approach	through	SF,	or	in	other	words,	how	institutions	deal	
with	the	contested	devolution.	 	 	 	
To	 provide	 more	 grounded	 discussions,	 we	 complemented	 the	 review	 with	 our	 personal	
observations	in	both	following	and	engaging	in	the	activities	of	social	forestry	working	groups	tasked	
with	developing	national	policies	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia.	 	
Finally,	 data	 was	 also	 gathered	 from	 informal	 interviews	 with	 key	 respondents	 and	 direct	
observations	during	field	visits	to	Son	La	and	Nghe	An	provinces	in	Vietnam	and	West	Kalimantan	
province	in	Indonesia	in	2012	and	2016	as	part	of	the	CIFOR	ASFCC	project.		 	
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4.	Results	
4.1.	Pathways	of	CF	policy	developments	
4.1.1.	Vietnam	 	
SF	practices	were	common	in	Vietnam	until	the	1960s.	 	 After	the	central	state	took	control	of	
forests	through	collectivization	campaigns,	local	systems	were	replaced	by	cooperatives	(Sunderlin	
and	Huynh	2005)	and	state	 forest	enterprises	 (SFEs).	 	 In	1991,	 reforms	 towards	a	more	market	
based	economy	included	realization	that	the	SFE	system	was	not	effective	and	was	failing	financially.	 	
As	a	result,	 the	strong	state	control	of	 forests	was	rescinded	and	approaches	for	privatization	of	
forestry	were	piloted,	mainly	though	donor	funded	projects	(Wode	and	Huy,	2009).	 	 Villages	and	
or	households	were	designated	to	replace	SFEs	as	the	managers	of	natural	forests	(Sikor	and	Apel	
1998).	 To	 mobilize	 people	 in	 forest	 protection	 and	 reforestation	 actions,	 the	 Vietnamese	
Government	adopted	a	series	of	policies	to	promote	community	participation	in	forestry	(Sikor	and	
Nguyen,	2007).	 	 Vietnam	implemented	national	programs	to	(i)	prioritize	forest	land	allocation	to	
households	 and	 household	 groups,	 particularly	 to	 the	 poor	 and	 to	 ethnic	 minorities	 whose	
livelihoods	are	closely	linked	to	traditional	forest	management;	(ii)	decentralize	forest	management;	
and	(iii)	develop	pro-poor	mechanisms	targeting	groups	involved	in	innovative	forest	management	
solutions.	However,	it	was	only	with	the	Law	on	Forest	Protection	and	Development	in	2004,	that	
the	concept	of	‘Community	Forest	Management	(CFM)’	was	officially	recognized.	CFM	was	defined	
as	“any	managerial	arrangement	in	which	local	people	share	collective	responsibility	and	benefits	
from	managing	natural	forests,	inside	their	community	boundaries,	for	which	they	have	long-term	
customary	 and/or	 legal	 rights	 of	 entitlement”	 (Wode	 and	 Huy,	 2009;	 RECOFTC,	 2014).	 	 SF	 in	
Vietnam	 was	 also	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 government’s	 Forest	 Land	 Allocation	 Program	 (FLA)	
(Sunderlin,	2006).	
SF	in	Vietnam	can	be	grouped	into	two	main	types.	The	first	is	village	forest	management	(VFM),	
where	forest	 is	managed	collectively	by	a	forest	management	group	to	which	all	households	in	a	
village	belong.	The	second	 is	 forest	management	by	groups	of	households,	which	 is	 formed	by	a	
small	 number	 of	 households	 –	 a	 subset	 of	 a	 village.	 The	 HHG	 model	 is	 applied	 where	 village	
population	 is	dispersed	 in	different	settlements.	Each	HHG	often	manages	a	patch	of	forest	near	
their	homestead	and	is	characterized	by	small	groups	of	not	more	than	20	households	and	who	are	
usually	fairly	homogenous	in	terms	of	ethnic	composition	and/or	interest.	The	VFM	model,	on	the	
other	hand	involves	the	whole	village	population.	 	
SF	 in	Vietnam	can	be	characterized	as	a	practical	approach	in	 linking	poverty	alleviation	and	
forest	management	goals.	While	there	appears	to	be	some	tolerance	for	inclusiveness	and	diversity	
in	how	SF	is	implemented,	it	does	reinforce	notions	of	the	community	or	village	as	homogeneous	
social	structures.	
4.1.2.	Indonesia	 	
In	Indonesia,	the	state	designates	forest	area	to	be	managed	by	the	state.	Failure	of	effective	
state	management	of	forests	led	to	the	introduction	of	Social	Forestry	in	the	late	1970s	and	became	
a	 government	 policy	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 (Lindayati,	 2002).	 	 SF	 was	 defined	 as	 a	 system	 of	
management	of	forests	(on	either	state	forest	or	private	forestland)	that	involves	local	communities	
with	 the	 goal	 to	 improve	 their	 wellbeing	 and	 realize	 sustainable	 forestry	 (Hakim	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 	
Under	this	definition,	SF	was	not	fully	meant	as	a	policy	for	decentralization	of	rights	but	rather,	was	
perceived	 more	 as	 a	 “development”	 program	 for	 villages	 located	 in	 forest	 areas,	 and	 its	
implementation	became	the	responsibility	of	 the	 forest	corporations	holding	official	exploitation	
permits	in	forest	concessions.	Over	the	subsequent	two	decades,	SF	remained	an	insignificant	part	
of	 forestry	 practices,	 adopted	 on	 small	 scales	 by	 concessionaires	 and	 the	 state	 forest	 company	
primarily	as	an	approach	to	solve	local	tenure	conflicts	(Lindayati,	2002).	The	forest	management	
practices	of	local	people	who	lived	within	or	around	state	designated	forest	land	remained	largely	
invisible.	 	
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In	 the	 absence	 of	 dedicated	 higher	 regulations	 on	 SF,	 the	 ministry	 developed	 various	
community	 forestry	 schemes	 through	ministerial	decrees.	Between	1991	and	1998,	 several	 such	
decrees	tried	to	regulate	SF	in	concessions	(HPH-Bina	Desa	Hutan),	in	special	use	zones	(KdTK)	and	
in	the	general	forest	estate	(HKM).	The	new	forestry	law	of	1999	included	provisions	for	the	role	of	
local	communities	in	management	of	forests	(e.g.	articles	68-70	and	article	34)	throughout	the	forest	
estate.	 	
The	 implementing	 regulation	 of	 Law	 41,	 1999	 (Government	 Regulation	 (GR)	 34,	 2002	 later	 	
replaced	by	GR	6,	2007,	 	 laid	out	different	 formal	 schemes	of	 SF,	 i.e.	 community	 forest,	 village	
forest,	people’s	plantation	forest	and	collaborative	management,	with	specific	access	and	use	rules.	 	 	
Although	explicitly	stated	to	aim	for	community	empowerment,	all	these	formal	legal	schemes	are	
based	on	permits	to	be	requested	by	local	communities	and	granted	by	the	state.	 	 Interest	in	SF	
since	 then	 has	 waxed	 and	waned	 according	 to	 government	 priorities	 but	 also	 according	 to	 the	
dominant	discourse.	 	 In	2002,	the	empowerment	discourse	moved	SF	as	an	umbrella	program	but	
when	ministers	changed,	other	priorities	took	over.	 	 SF	progressed	regardless,	but	at	a	very	slow	
pace	with	only	few	permits	requested	and	granted.	 	
	 The	 global	 movement	 for	 indigenous	 rights,	 linked	 closely	 with	 issues	 of	 environmental	
change	and	sustainable	development,	gained	increasing	momentum	throughout	the	2000s	driven	
by	 the	 establishment	 of	 AMAN	 (Alliance	 of	 Indigenous	 Communities	 of	 Indonesia)	 in	 1999	
(Ardiansyah	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 	 The	Midterm	National	 Development	 Plan	 2010-2014	 set	 a	 target	 to	
devolve	7.9	million	hectares	of	state	forest	land	to	local	communities	(Praputra	et	al.,	2015).	In	2014,	
the	new	government,	continued	this	policy	commitment	to	SF	by	promising	to	assign	12.7	million	
hectares	to	local	community	management	by	2019	(Dirjen	PSKL,	2015)	and	has	also	framed	SF	as	
part	 of	 broader	 initiatives	 for	 agrarian	 reform	 (Presidential	 regulation	 88,	 2017).	 The	 stated	
objectives	remain	focused	on	poverty	alleviation,	envisioned	as	a	lack	of	access	to	land.	 	 However,	
it	is	the	pressure	of	land	conflicts,	demands	for	recognition	of	rights	and	agrarian	reform	that	has	
given	SF	its	contemporary	urgency	in	Indonesia.	 	 	
4.2.	How	SF	is	framed	in	policies	
4.2.1.	Vietnam	
Although	the	Forest	Land	Allocation	(FLA)	 is	not	a	SF	program	per	definition,	SF	was	 initially	
framed	through	FLA	policies	with	 the	stated	objectives	 to	 increase	 forest	cover,	 improved	 forest	
quality,	and	contribute	to	hunger	eradication	and	poverty	reduction	in	impoverished	upland	areas	
(To	 and	 Tran,	 2014).	 	 The	 two	models	 mentioned	 above	 were	 the	 offshoot	 of	 FLA	 which	 was	
implemented	since	1983	and	 later	 strengthened	by	 the	Land	Law	of	1993	 (Decree	No.	02/CP	on	
forest	land	allocation),	and	the	revised	Land	Law	of	2003.	The	Land	Law	confirms	state	ownership	
over	forests	and	defines	the	rights	of	land	users	in	terms	of	land	use,	transfer,	concession,	lease,	
mortgage	and	contribution	of	capital	on	the	basis	of	land	value.	The	law	further	provides	use	rights	
for	up	to	30	ha	of	production	and	protection	forests	for	up	to	50	years	per	user/community	and	was	
intended	to	stimulate	private	investment	(Sunderlin,	2006;	Wode	and	Huy,	2009).	
FLA	itself,	is	however,	not	exclusively	about	allocating	land	to	households	and	individuals.	To	
and	 Tran	 (2014)	 distinguishes	 three	 main	 forms	 of	 FLA:	 (i)	 forest	 land	 allocation	 to	 state	
organizations,	mainly	 forest	companies;	 (ii)	 forest	 land	allocation	 to	households,	 individuals,	and	
communities;	and	(iii)	contract-based	allocation	of	forest	land	to	households	and	individuals	either	
by	forest	companies	or	the	state.	 	
There	have	been	many	assessments	of	the	impacts	of	forest	and	land	allocation	for	households	
and	groups	of	households	with	varied	results.	Helvetas	Vietnam	(2002)	claimed	that	FLA	resulted	in	
improved	livelihoods	of	poor	farmers.	Yet	it	is	also	claimed	that	households	and	communities	did	
not	 gain	 any	 actual	 control	 over	 local	 forests:	 they	 still	 have	 to	 seek	 permission	 from	 relevant	
agencies	to	harvest	trees	and	use	forestland,	and	they	often	have	 limited	understanding	of	their	
rights	and	duties	 (Nguyen	et	al.,	2008).	To	and	Tran	 (2014)	observed	 the	 improvement	of	 forest	
quality	but	skewed	improvements	in	livelihood	where	some	people	were	able	to	disproportionally	
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capture	most	benefits.	 	 Wode	and	Huy	(2009)	mentioned	the	problems	with	mapping	and	limited	
participation	resulting	in	uncertainties	of	the	allocations	and	disproportionate	sharing	of	benefits.	 	
In	2004,	 the	Vietnam	Law	on	Forest	Protection	and	Development	 legalized	the	allocation	of	
natural	forests	for	communities	to	manage,	and	thus	formally	recognizing	SF,	thereby	recognizing	
indigenous	norms	and	systems	of	organization	(Sikor	and	Apel,	1998),	and	encouraging	local	people	
to	 increase	 the	 revenue	 base	 for	 community	 forestry	 regimes	 (Sunderlin	 and	 Huynh,	 2005).	
Meanwhile,	the	Vietnam	Forestry	Strategy	2006-	2020	sets	out	a	clear	priority	to	allocate	forests	for	
communities	to	protect	and	to	benefit	from	the	forests.	 	 By	the	end	of	2009,	local	communities	
held	 tenure	 rights	 in	 up	 to	 26%	 of	 the	 total	 forest	 area	 in	 the	 country,	 either	 as	 individual	
households,	household	groups,	or	village	collectives	(Sikor	and	Nguyen,	2011).	 	
	
Table	2.	SF	models	in	Vietnam	
Management	
regime	
Policy	 target	 and	
area	implemented	
Notes	 Relevant	legislation	
Traditional	and	
customary	forests	
managed	by	local	
communities	
MARD	assumed	
that	this	area	is	
relatively	small	
estimated	as	 	
247,030	ha	 	
Self	
sufficiency	
2003	Land	Law:	recognizing	and	regulating	the	
legal	status	of	village	communities	in	land	
tenure.	 	
2004	Forest	Protection	and	Development	Law:	
recognizing	legal	status	of	village	communities	
in	forest	management.	
Decree	29/1998/ND-CP	in	May	1998,	later	
amended	to	Decree	79/2003/ND-CP	in	July	
2003:	on	grassroots	democracy	
Forests	and	Forest	
land	that	the	State	
allocates	to	
communities	to	
manage	
524,477	hectares	
according	to	MARD	
(2013)	 	
Must	be	
managed	
as	forest;	
small	scale	
wood	
production	
for	
industry	
Decree	No.	02/1994/ND-CP:	regulating	forest	
land	allocation	to	organizations,	households	
and	individuals	for	long	term	and	stable	use	on	
forestry	purpose.	 	
Decree	No.	01/1995/ND-CP:	on	land	allocation	
for	use	in	agricultural,	forestry	production,	
aquatic	product	rearing	within	state-owned	
enterprises.	
Decree	No.	01/CP/1995:	on	contracting	
agricultural	land,	production	forest	and	surface	
water	for	aquaculture	production	to	
organizations.	
Decision	799/QĐ-TTg	dated	27/6/2012	on	
approval	of	the	National	REDD+	Action	Program	
Group	of	
households	that	
collectively	
manage	area	of	
forests	that	are	
allocated	to	their	
individual	HHs	 	 	
No	figure	available	 	 Decision	No.	187/1999/QĐ-CP:	on	renovation	
of	organizational	structure	and	management	
mechanism	of	SFE	directing	SFEs	to	give	forest	
lands	back	to	the	districts,	so	that	they	could	be	
further	allocated	to	households.	
Decree	No.	163/1999/ND-CP:	on	assigning	and	
leasing	forestland.	
Vietnam	 has	 also	 linked	 different	 payment	 for	 environmental	 services,	 such	 as	 the	 PFES	
(Payment	for	Forest	Environmental	Services)	and	REDD+	(Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	
and	 forest	 Degradation	 and	 enhancement	 of	 carbon	 stocks)	 to	 forms	 of	 community-managed	
forests.	 	 The	PFES	program	has	been	 implemented	nationally	 since	Decision	99	 in	2010.	Article	
eight	 in	this	Decision	states	that	village	communities,	who	are	allocated	forestland	for	 long-term	
usage,	are	the	beneficiaries	of	forest	payment.	As	an	 incentive	to	encourage	communities	to	get	
involved	 in	 forest	 protection	 and	management,	 the	 PFES	 scheme	 compensates	 communities	 for	
forest	 protection	 activities.	 Moreover,	 the	 implementation	 of	 PFES	 acts	 as	 a	 catalyst	 to	 move	
forward	forest	allocation	to	communities.	 	
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In	 2012,	 the	 Vietnamese	 Government	 issued	 Decision	 799/QĐ-TTg	 on	 27/6/2012,	 which	
approved	the	REDD+	National	Action	Plan.	According	to	this,	communities	are	at	the	forefront	of	
forest	protection	and	stand	to	benefit	from	REDD+	payments.	Both	PFES	and	REDD+	are	designed	
as	incentives	for	community	forestry	management	and	protection.	 	
Forestry	 regulations	 are	 also	 often	 implemented	 in	 different	ways	 in	 different	 provinces	 or	
regions.	Some	provinces	are	more	flexible	and	progressive	than	others	and	can	set	up	trial	sites	for	
community	 forestry	 before	 the	 central	 government	 legally	 acknowledges	 this	 form	 of	 forest	
management	(Pham	et	al.,	2012).	SF	practices	might	therefore	not	fit	neatly	into	the	government	
schemes	 as	 shown	 in	 Table	 2	 for	 Vietnam.	 Indeed,	 in	 practice	 people	 often	 ignore	 government	
programs	or	adapt	the	programs	in	accordance	to	local	context.	 	 	 	
4.2.2.	Indonesia	
Law	41,	1999	on	Forestry	and	its	derivatives	(in	particular	government	regulation	(GR)	no	6,	
2007	and	its	revision	(GR)	no	3,	2008,	provided	an	early	elaboration	on	how	local	communities	can	
gain	access	to	state	forest,	i.e.	through	permits	to	manage	community	forests	(HKm),	village	forests	
(HD)	 or	 small	 scale	 plantations	 (HTR)	 in	 accordance	 to	 the	 forest	 zoning,	 i.e.	 production	 and	
protected	forest	(See	Table	3).	A	latest	iteration	of	implementing	regulations	is	Ministerial	Decree	P	
83/2016.	
	
Table	3:	SF	schemes	according	to	official	policies	in	Indonesia 
Management	regime	 Policy	target	and	area	
implemented	
Notes	 Relevant	legislation	
Groups	with	management	rights	
to	production	or	protection	
forests	(community	forests	or	
HKM)	
Target	to	2020	is	12.7	ha	for	all	
schemes.	 	 In	2016,	55000	ha	
was	approved	but	permits	
were	issued	for	2465	ha	 	
	 Permenhut	P.52/2011	
replaced	by	P.83/2016	
	
Villages	with	management	rights	
to	a	production	or	protection	
forests	(Village	forests	or	HD)	
Target	to	2020	is	12.7	ha	for	all	
schemes.	 	 In	2016,	114,496	
ha	was	approved	and	73,190	
ha	was	issued	 	 permits	 	
	 Permenhut	P.53/2011.	
Now	replaced	by	
P.83/2016	
Individuals	or	groups	managing	
plantations	in	the	forest	zone	
(HTR)	
Target	to	2020	is	12.7	ha	for	all	
schemes.	 	 In	2016,	22,853	ha	
was	approved	and	14.131	ha	
was	issued	 	 permits	 	
This	can	be	done	in	
partnership	with	private	or	
state	owned	companies	
Permenhut	P.55/2011.	
Now	replaced	by	
P.83/2016	
	
Individuals	or	groups	managing	
tree	plantations	on	privately	
owned	land	
	 Although	mentioned	in	the	
laws,	private	forest	is	often	
outside	state	control	 	
Now	replaced	by	
P.83/2016	
Customary	communities	
managing	customary	forest	(HA)	
	 	 Constitutional	Court	
Decree	(MK)	35/PPU-
X/2012	and	P.83/2016	
Forest	in	all	zones	managed	in	
partnership	between	
communities	and	(legal	forest	
managers)	
In	2016,	24,468	ha	was	
allocated	for	collaborative	
management	
The	forest	managers	are	
state	agencies	but	can	be	
companies.	 	
P.83/2016	
Source:	KEMENLHK	(Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forestry),	2016	
	
Collaborative	 management	 in	 conservation	 areas	 is	 regulated	 by	 yet	 another	 decree	
(P.49/2008).	 	 Outside	the	State	Forest	land,	forests	on	privately	owned	land	are	managed	by	the	
rights	holders	as	private	forest	(Law	41,	1999)	or	customary	forest	(MK	35,	2012)	although	no	further	
special	regulations	currently	exist.	 	
In	general	government	schemes	allow	only	rights	of	use	linked	to	responsibility	to	maintain	the	
forest.	 	 The	different	rights	are	described	in	Table	4	below.	
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Table	4:	Extent	of	rights	in	government	SF	schemes:	
Scheme	 Extent	of	rights	 Time	limit	 Purpose	 	 Discourses/	
Objectives	as	
stated	in	draft	
regulation	
HKM	
(community	
forest)	
	 Rights	to	manage	and	use	
NTFPs	allocated	to	groups	
35	years	
extendable	
For	harvesting	timber	an	
additional	permit	is	
required	
To	empower	
HD	(Village	
forest)	
Rights	to	manage	an	use	the	
forest	(NTFPs	and	or	
environmental	services)	
allocated	to	villages	 	
35	years	
extendable	
Often	managed	by	the	
Village	Enterprise	even	
when	mainly	managed	for	
ecosystem	services	
To	improve	
welfare/well	
being	for	the	
village	
HTR(People’s	
plantation	
forest)	
Use	rights	to	land	in	
production	forest	to	
manage	and	use	timber	
planted.	Allocated	to	
individuals	or	cooperatives	
35	years	
extendable	
	
these	small	scale	timber	
plantations	are	often	
managed	in	collaboration	
with	a	large	corporation	
To	improve	the	
potential	and	
quality	of	
production	forest	
Partnership	 Rights	to	collaborate	in	
activities	related	to	
management	of	forest	
	 Limited	to	2	Ha	per	head	
of	HH	or	5	Ha	per	HH	
Empowerment	of	
local	communities	
by	forest	
managers	
HA	
(Customary	
forests)	
Full	ownership	by	
customary	communities	
No	time	limit	 The	follow-up	regulations	
detailing	the	scopes	of	
the	rights	and	right	
holders	of	the	HA	are	yet	
to	be	issued	by	the	local	
government.	
	
	
SF	 is	 the	 legal	 mandate	 of	 the	 MoEF	 and	 therefore	 primarily	 regulated	 by	 forestry	 laws,	
regulations	and	ministerial	decrees.	However,	as	a	category	of	land	use,	SF	is	also	bound	by	the	law	
on	 spatial	 planning,	 the	 land	 law,	 the	 law	 on	 regional	 government	 and	 the	 law	 on	 villages,	 all	
mandated	 by	 different	 authorities.	 	 Further,	 SF	 should	 defer	 to	 the	 national	 and	 regional	
development	plans,	and	the	use	of	land	for	‘strategic’	purposes	such	as	mining	and	roads.	At	local	
level,	this	plethora	of	laws	and	regulations	leads	to	contradictory	and	uneven	implementation.	
4.3.	SF	within	decentralization	policies	
Vietnam	 and	 Indonesia	 are	 two	 countries	 that	 have	 experimented	 broadly	 with	
decentralization	processes,	including	through	SF	programs.	 	 The	Vietnam	SF	policy,	for	example,	is	
closely	linked	to	Forest	Land	Allocation	(FLA)	but	has	also	been	driven	by	decentralization	processes	
such	as	Decree	29/1998	and	 its	amendment	Decree	79/2003	on	Grassroots	democracy	aimed	to	
enhance	 wider	 public	 and	 social	 participation	 of	 different	 non-state	 actors	 group	 including	
communities.	In	Indonesia,	administrative	decentralization	policies	have	gone	further	than	Vietnam,	
although	actual	devolution	of	management	 rights	of	 forest	 to	 local	 communities	has	been	 slow.	 	
Targets	are	ambitious,	4	million	ha	of	the	15.2	million	ha	forest	land	in	Vietnam	(RECOFTC,	2014)	
and	12.7	million	ha	of	the	143	million	total	forest	land	in	Indonesia	are	to	be	devolved	to	local	people	
by	2020	(Dirjen	PSKL.	2015).	
Devolution	of	forestland	and	resources	from	the	state	to	local	people	is	assumed	to	result	in	
improved	 forest	 as	 well	 as	 improved	 livelihood.	 	 Implicit	 is	 empowerment	 of	 people.	 	 As	 the	
Vietnam	 policy	 states:	 “land	 allocation	 makes	 forests	 officially	 owned,	 attaching	 rights	 to	
responsibilities,	 and	 offering	 favorable	 conditions	 for	 local	 people	 to	 protect	 forest,	who	 find	 it	
secure	to	manage,	invest,	and	develop	and	allocate	forest.”	(MARD’s	master	plan	for	forest	lease	
and	allocation,	2007:	5	quoted	in	To	and	Tran,	2014).	 	 	
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In	practice,	both	countries	are	very	centralized	with	regard	to	forest	governance	(Brockhaus	
and	Di	Gregorio,	 2014).	 	 In	 Indonesia,	 SF	 is	 simply	 considered	a	permit	 to	manage	 forests	with	
implementation	 rigidly	 regulated	and	or	 tied	within	a	web	of	 complex	 regulations	around	 forest	
products	harvesting,	transporting	and	selling	(Ministerial	Decree	P.83,	2016).	As	found	elsewhere,	
the	rural	poor	under	well	intended	SF	policies	must	compete	on	“an	uneven	playing	field	of	…	social	
inequities	and	economic	hurdles”	(Larson	and	Ribot,	2007).	 	 Indeed,	it	might	seem	that	the	official	
SF	policy	is	an	attempt	to	re-centralize,	to	re-assert	control	over	forest	resources	by	the	government	
(Maryudi,	 2012;	 Schusser	 et	 al.,	 2015;	Adiwibowo	et	 al.,	 2016).	 	 Simply	 put,	 state-led	 land	 and	
forest	 reform	 strategies	 often	 do	 not	 succeed	 because	 “bureaucratic	 modalities	 cannot	
accommodate	 the	 varying	 meanings	 of	 land,	 plural	 notions	 of	 property,	 and	 diverse	 political-
economic	contexts”	(Sikor	and	Müller,	2009).	 	
As	mentioned	earlier,	 local	people	are	also	subject	to	policies	from	other	sectors,	which	are	
often	 contradictory	 or	 inconsistent,	 and	 add	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 SF.	 In	 the	 Vietnam	 Forest	
Protection	and	Development	Law	of	2004,	for	example,	communities	are	recognized	as	legal	entities	
and	 allowed	 to	 enter	 forest	 protection	 contracts.	 	 Yet,	 in	 the	 Land	 Law	 and	 Civil	 Code	 2005,	
communities	are	not	allowed	to	enter	any	 legal	contract,	unless	registered	 in	the	commune	as	a	
group	of	households	(civil	code)	or	as	cooperatives	(circular	07/TTLT	MARD	and	MONRE).	 	 	
In	 Indonesia,	 the	 new	 law	 on	 village	 governance	 (Law	 6,	 2014)	 gives	 villages	 autonomy	 to	
manage	their	assets,	including	village	owned	forests.	 	 Yet	the	Forestry	Law	sets	state	authority	over	
all	forests	at	national	level.	 	 Furthermore,	it	remains	unclear	to	what	extent	state	forest	within	the	
village	area	is	a	village	asset.	On	the	other	hand,	in	practice,	rights	of	a	village	to	the	exclusive	use	
of	major	forest	products	from	forests	in	its	vicinity	have	always	been	de	facto	recognized.	 	
In	the	context	of	overall	forest	governance,	the	plethora	and	complexity	of	laws	and	regulations	
pertaining	to	local	land	use	that	appear	unrelated	and	contradictory	is	a	main	issue.	 	 Because	of	
this	complexity,	local	communities	have	difficulty	in	following	the	process	and	the	local	government	
tends	to	treat	SF	as	an	administrative	issue,	an	exercise	of	ticking	the	boxes,	reducing	SF	permits	to	
merely	 confirm	 de	 facto	 use	 of	 forest	 land	 by	 local	 people	 without	 real	 attempts	 to	 improve	
governance	of	forests	or	empower	local	people.	 	 Under	lack	of	clarity,	forest	administrators	tend	
to	merely	follow	the	letter	of	the	law	and	forget	the	spirit	of	the	law.   
5.	Discussion	
In	 the	 following	 sub-sections,	 we	 discuss	 the	 (in)effectiveness	 and	 adequacy	 of	 existing	 SF	
policies	as	an	instrument	for	recognizing	community	rights,	empowering	local	forest	communities,	
reducing	 poverty,	 and	 for	 improving	 forest	 governance	 based	 on	 the	 literature	 review	 and	
complemented	with	findings	from	our	field	research.	 	
5.1.	The	spirit	of	SF	laws:	competing	or	complementary	values	and	discourses?	 	
Like	general	laws,	SF	laws	and	regulations	are	shaped	by	the	political	economy	of	a	nation	as	
well	as	global	discourse	on	environmental	and	rights	issues	(Brosius	et	al	1998;	Li,	2002).	 	 Although	
on	 the	one	hand,	SF	emerged	out	of	global	 ideals	of	democracy	and	 local	 rights	 (Chomba	et	al.,	
2014),	 as	McCarthy	 (2005)	 claims,	 SF	 has	 also	developed	 from	 the	 confluence	of	 environmental	
governance,	neoliberal	policy	agendas	and	responsiveness	to	contingent	historical	and	geographical	
factors.	 	 	
These	 social	 political	 contexts	 at	 different	 times	 gave	 rise	 to	 different	 discourses	 which	
influenced	how	SF	was	perceived.	 	 The	perceived	failure	of	the	forest	industry	model	of	the	state	
on	the	one	hand,	and	the	increasing	rate	of	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	on	the	other	hand	
(Gilmour,	 2016)	 led	 to	 a	 discourse	 of	 resource	 scarcity.	 The	 belief	 that	 community	 control	 over	
forests	is	or	can	be	more	ecologically	friendly	with	properly	crafted	rules	and	norms	governing	use	
led	to	SF	for	tropical	forest	conservation.	The	rising	dominance	of	the	neo	liberal	economy	in	the	
1990s,	gave	rise	to	the	discourse	of	community	forestry	enterprise	(de	Jong,	2012),	assuming	that	
communities	who	are	able	to	profit	substantively	from	the	forests	will	be	inclined	to	manage	them	
sustainably.	 	
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While	these	SF	discourses	are	somewhat	sequential	(de	Jong,	2012),	they	are	not	exclusive	and	
overlap	 and	 mix	 with	 parallel	 discourses.	 For	 example,	 the	 social	 justice	 discourses	 driving	
participatory	 development	 and	 ‘Bottom	 up	 Planning’	 approaches	 of	 the	 early	 1980s	 and	 the	
movement	 for	 rights	 of	 indigenous	 and	 other	 local	 communities	 to	 exercise	 control	 over	 their	
traditional	natural	resources	have	contributed	to	the	development	of	SF	as	a	rights-based	approach.	 	
The	 discussion	 above	 highlights	 the	 influence	 of	 discourses	 and	 values	 and	 interests	 of	 the	
national	institutions	on	the	objectives	and	regulations	on	SF.	 	 However,	all	regulations	and	policy,	
highlight	 that	 SF	 intends	 that	 forest	 should	 be	 for	 the	 people	 by	 the	 people.	 Yet,	 institutional	
stickiness	and	attachment	to	power	has	made	full	devolution	of	forests	an	elusive	dream.	 	 Time	
and	again,	powerful	actors	remain	reluctant	to	give	up	management	power	and	the	benefits	to	be	
gained	(Edmund	and	Wollenberg,	2003;	Dahal	and	Capistrano,	2006;	Sunderlin,	2006;	Schusser	et	
al.,	2015;	Adiwibowo,	2016).	
There	remains	a	tension	between	governments	(and	powerful	non-state	actors)	trying	to	exert	
control	over	forestland	and	local	people	claiming	or	reclaiming	rights	over	resources	they	consider	
their	heritage.	There	are	tensions	between	processes	of	recentralization	and	decentralization,	and	
between	processes	of	gaining	access	and	exercising	access.	 	 An	example	is	how	in	Kalimantan,	the	
decentralization	 in	1999,	allowed	 local	 communities	 the	 right	 to	 log	 their	 forests.	 	 This	 led	 to	a	
logging	boom	benefiting	local	people	but	also	leading	to	some	environmental	damage.	 	 In	2002,	
this	right	was	re-centralized	to	the	province	and	communities	were	no	longer	allowed	logging	rights.	 	
In	Vietnam,	there	are	cases	where	large,	often	state	owned	companies	took	over	the	land	already	
allocated	to	individual	households.	Although	the	grassroots	democracy	decree	promises	protection	
of	local	rights,	State	interest	takes	precedence	in	practice.	Indeed	a	contested	devolution.	
5.2.	SF	as	a	rights	based	approach?	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 both	 Vietnam	 and	 Indonesia,	 SF	 has	 become	 one	 approach	 to	 solve	
conflicts	 and	 to	 recognize	 rights	 of	 indigenous	 or	 local	 communities.	 	 Yet,	 rights	 are	 allocated	
rather	than	recognized,	and	limited	to	use	and	management	only	rather	than	ownership	or	control.	 	 	
The	constitution	of	Vietnam	states	that	all	land	belongs	to	the	state	and	citizens	have	only	use	rights.	 	
The	government	of	Indonesia	does	not	claim	to	‘own’(memiliki)	all	land	but	instead	uses	the	word	
‘control’(menguasai)	 thereby	claiming	 the	right	of	disposal	and	thus	 the	right	 to	allocate	 land	or	
‘permit’	others	to	use	the	land.	
In	the	context	of	SF,	forest	management	is	considered	a	communal	effort	and	land	is	allocated	
to	groups	or	communities.	However,	traditionally,	while	the	rights	to	a	forest	or	landscape	might	be	
communal,	there	is	often	a	nested	mix	of	communal	and	individual	rights,	e.g.	 in	Kalimantan	the	
tembawang	agro-forest	is	a	communal	property	with	individual	rights	to	certain	trees	(Peluso	1996),	
and	in	Sulawesi,	forest	farmers	groups	were	formed	to	gain	a	CF	permit	but	in	practice,	little	patches	
of	forest	are	used	and	managed	individually.	 	 This	is	in	contrast	to	some	cases	in	Vietnam	where	
forestland	is	allocated	to	individual	households	while	the	community	might	in	fact	rather	manage	it	
communally	(Sikor	and	Nguyen,	2011).	 	 The	disconnect	between	rights	allocation	and	household	
and	community	forest	use	strategies	could	disrupt	local	governance	structures	and	how	benefits	are	
captured.	 	 It	is	therefore	necessary	to	better	understand	the	interlinkages	between	communal	and	
individual	 rights	and	how	communities	operate	 in	relation	to	 forest	as	part	of	SF	policy	design	 if	
objectives	of	empowerment	and	devolution	of	rights	are	to	be	taken	seriously.	 	 	 	
In	 both	 Vietnam	 and	 Indonesia,	 legal	 rights	 of	 use	 to	 forestland	 and	 resources	 come	 with	
restrictions:	they	are	usually	time	bound,	allow	only	certain	uses,	and	with	only	part	of	the	bundle	
of	rights	(e.g.	no	alienation	or	conversion	to	other	uses)	are	transferable.	 	 These	rights	also	come	
with	associated	responsibilities:	 to	manage	the	forest	 in	accordance	with	technical	 requirements	
often	for	forest	protection	and	rehabilitation	rather	than	production	for	local	livelihood	needs,	and	
includes	submitting	management	plans	and	budgets	often	beyond	the	ability	of	local	people.	 	 	
Local	 communities	 might	 therefore	 reject	 these	 programs,	 either	 because	 they	 are	 not	
interested	in	managing	forest	or	because	it	does	not	recognize	their	historical	rights,	as	occurred	in	
one	community	forest	area	in	South	Sulawesi	(Moeliono	et	al.,	2015b).	Instead,	it	reinforces	what	is	
‘given’	by	the	state	and	therefore,	can	also	be	revoked	by	the	state.	
Forest and Society. Vol. 1(2):78-97, November 2017 89 
	
Although,	SF	is	positioned	as	a	solution	within	the	rights	based	approach,	it	is	also	recognized	
that,	even	when	communities	desire	SF,	tenure	rights	alone	do	not	guarantee	its	success	(Sikor	and	
Nguyen,	2011;	Larson	et	al.,	2010).	 	 Secure	 tenure	 leads	 to	desirable	environmental,	economic,	
political,	and	cultural	outcomes	only	 if	 local	 communities	 can	 realize	 the	 rights	given	 to	 them	 in	
legislation.	For	example,	tenure	transfers	have	little	meaning	if	forest	regulations	and	logging	bans	
severely	 restrict	 the	 concrete	 rights	 accorded	 to	 people	 to	 use	 and	 extract	 timber	 and	 other	
resources.	Transfers	also	possess	little	value	if	they	emphasize	protection	obligations	over	rights	to	
forest	use	and	management.	In	addition,	legal	tenure	rights	often	do	not	translate	into	real	rights	
on	 the	ground	 if	 local	authorities	and	communities	do	not	have	 the	capacity	 to	 implement	 legal	
stipulations	(Larson	et	al	2010;	Barry	et	al.,	2010).	 	
At	the	same	time,	focus	on	tenure	has	been	at	the	expense	of	the	more	technical	matters	of	
good	forest	management	(Moeliono	et	al.,	2015b).	 	 Often	communities	are	given	areas	that	are	
less	productive	or	poor	quality	forest,	or	are	expected	to	restore	degraded	land	without	adequate	
technical	input	(Sunderlin,	2006;	Wode	and	Huy,	2009;	Le,	2010;	Pulhin	et	al.,	2010).	As	Dressler	et	
al	 (2010)	 also	 found,	 governments	 tend	 to	 consider	 their	 task	 done	 when	 policies	 are	 made,	
communities	informed,	land	allocated	or	permits	issued.	 	 There	is	little	effort	to	help	communities	
understand	their	rights	and	responsibilities	regarding	the	allocated	forests.	In	most	instances,	local	
people	 accept	 their	 responsibility	 to	 protect	 or	 manage	 the	 allocated	 forest,	 but	 have	 little	
understanding	of	the	related	responsibilities	of	others,	particularly	state	actors,	to	support	them	in	
realizing	their	endowed	rights	(Maryudi	et	al.,	2012)	
Furthermore,	the	institutional	aspects	of	governance	are	often	neglected.	 	 Permits	or	rights	
were	at	times	allocated	to	groups	where	such	groups	are	not	well	established	nor	have	a	communal	
identity	(Indonesia)	or	to	individuals	where	traditional	systems	are	communal	(Vietnam).	 	 Rather	
than	strengthening	governance,	the	introduced	schemes	can	cause	disruption	and	conflict	and	lead	
to	disempowerment	(Blaikie,	2006;	Moeliono	et	al.,	2015b;	Maryudi	et	al.,	2016).	
5.3.	SF	as	a	new	mode	of	governance?	
SF	might	also	be	considered	as	a	new	mode	of	governance,	where	the	failure	of	the	state	to	
manage	forests	sustainably	and	or	solve	forest	land	conflicts	peacefully,	calls	for	redistribution	of	
power	and	decision	making	over	the	use	of	forest	with	the	expectation	that	this	would	lead	to	more	
sustainable	 forest	 management.	 Although	 as	 in	 Indonesia,	 while	 the	 law	mandates	 community	
empowerment,	it	is	unclear	as	to	what	it	implies	and	who	should	do	it.	‘Empowerment’	is	thus	simply	
translated	as	participation	or	involvement	of	local	community	in	forestry	activities.	Some	argue	that	
participation	 does	 not	 always	 empower	 as	 often	 only	 the	 elites	 in	 a	 community	 are	 able	 to	
participate.	 	 In	that	case,	participation	might	even	be	disempowering	(Agrawal,	2001,	Cooke	and	
Kothari,	2001)	
Community	empowerment	can	be	perceived	from	two	aspects:	firstly,	it	relates	to	the	ability	
of	an	individual	or	group	to	exercise	agency,	to	make	decisions,	and	take	ownership	of	their	lives.	 	
The	 second	 aspect	 relates	 to	 institutional	 structure,	 both	 state	 and	 non-state,	 that	 are	 more	
responsive	and	accountable	to	people	and	thus	enables	agency.	 	 Empowerment	is	thus	located	at	
the	 intersection	 of	 asset-based	 agency	 and	 institution-based	 opportunity	 with	 transformative	
processes	of	democracy	and	transfer	of	powers,	respectively	(Chomba	et	al.,	2014).	 	 However,	in	
the	 practice	 of	 SF,	 empowerment	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 state	 providing	 access	 to	 forestland	 and	
resources,	 thereby	simply	assuming	that	access	will	automatically	 lead	to	better	management	of	
forest	and	improved	livelihood.	
There	 is	no	acknowledgement	of	 the	ability	of	communities	 to	manage	 forests	 traditionally.	
There	is	no	recognition	that	a	“community”	comprises	a	complex	set	of	actors,	with	different	social,	
economic,	and	political	characteristics	such	as	wealth,	gender,	age,	ethnicity,	and	castes	(Agrawal	
and	Gibson	1999),	with	 different	 access	 to	 resources	 and	power,	 and	different	 interests	 in,	 and	
claims	over,	various	environmental	goods	and	services	(Leach	et	al.,	1999,	Nygren,	2000;	Chomba	
et	al.,	2016).	 	 	
Power	relations	are	often	the	most	resistant	part	of	institutions	to	change	(Wilshusen,	2009;	
Sneddon	 and	 Fox	 2007;	Wong,	 2010),	 perpetuated	 through	 political	 ties,	 family	 assets	 and	 land	
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holdings,	 family	 networks,	 and	 religious	 affiliations	 (Dasgupta	 and	 Beard	 2007;	 Lund	 and	 Saito-
Jensen	2013;	Schusser	et	al.,	2016).	 In	 the	processes	around	SF,	 the	State	usually	deals	with	 the	
village	 institution,	 and	 this	 institution	 is	 often	 also	 an	 apparatus	 of	 the	 State.	 	 Indeed,	 as	 we	
observed	in	rural	settings	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia,	local	institutions	led	by	a	village	head	is	often	
the	only	bridge	of	communication	between	the	community	and	external	interventions.	The	village	
head	is	usually	nominated	by	the	state	and	although	might	be	voted	for	local	people,	but	they	still	
need	to	get	formal	approval	from	the	party	to	be	formally	recognized	as	the	village	head.	The	power	
of	 access	 and	 information	 allows	 the	 local	 elites	 to	 “exert	 disproportionate	 influence	 over	 a	
collective	 action	 process”	 (Beard	 and	 Phakpian,	 2009).	 	 Elites	 tend	 to	 position	 themselves	 as	
decision	makers	and	promote	their	own	agenda	(Thoms,	2008).	Many	assessments	on	SF	include	
reports	on	how	elites	in	a	community	are	able	to	capture	most	of	the	benefits	(To	and	Tran,	2014;	
Maryudi	et	al.,	2012).	 	 While	these	examples	all	refer	to	power	relations	at	the	local	level,	when	
placing	SF	into	a	wider	political	economy	framework,	the	lack	of	changes	in	power	relations	beyond	
the	local	becomes	very	visible:	the	established	power	relations	between	state-	and	non-state	actors;	
state,	private	sector	and	civil	society;	and	national	and	local	level	power	relations	all	have	changed	
so	far	very	little	over	the	course	of	the	different	waves	of	SF,	if	at	all.	
SF	interventions	have	contributed	to	inequality	and	elite	capture,	especially	where	local	elites	
dominate	 the	village	enterprises	 (often	a	State	or	State-initiated	 institution)	assigned	to	manage	
village	forests	in	Indonesia	(Moeliono	et	al.,	2015a).	This	same	problem	can	be	exacerbated	when	
future	benefits	tied	to	community	forestry	practices	(such	as	PES	or	REDD+)	come	into	play.	Studies	
from	West	Kalimantan,	suggests	that	the	implementation	of	government	development	projects	or	
REDD+	without	intimate	knowledge	of	the	political	landscape	of	resource	struggle	can	easily	lead	to	
benefits	appropriated	by	local	elites	(Kallio	et	al.,	2016;	Eilenberg,	2015)	
Policy	 documents	 often	 imply	 that	 local	 communities	 are	weak	 and	 incapable	 of	managing	
forest	sustainably	without	prescriptive	rules.	Yet	proponents	of	SF	often	mention	the	weakness	of	
the	state	and	the	inability	of	government	institutions	to	manage	the	forest.	 	 Thus	on	the	one	hand,	
the	state	ignores	the	different	local	institutions	and	their	different	interests	and	on	the	other,	an	
often	mentioned	constraint	is	the	lack	of	government	institutions	responsible	for	SF.	
In	Vietnam,	there	is	no	official	government	institution	that	is	responsible	for	community	forest	
management	at	both	central	and	local	levels.	High	ranking	policy	makers	in	MARD	are	not	convinced	
about	the	important	role	of	SF	due	to	small	areas	of	only	3.76%	of	forest	that	are	currently	managed	
by	communities,	and	the	mixed	results	of	pilot	programs	which	shows	SF	is	not	always	effective1.	
However,	this	figure	only	refers	to	land	allocated	to	communities	for	communal	management	and	
overlooks	 the	 25%	 of	 total	 forests	 that	 are	 under	 community	 management	 (RECOFTC,	 2014)	
allocated	to	households,	as	a	large	proportion	of	individual	land	is	managed	at	communal	level.	 	
In	Indonesia,	the	new	government	of	Joko	Widodo	merged	the	Ministry	of	Forestry	with	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	 in	2015,	and	 formed	a	special	Directorate	General	 to	manage	SF.	 	 The	
Directorate	General	is	expected	achieve	the	target	of	allocating	12.7	million	hectares	for	SF	by	2020	
(RPJM).	 	 However,	SF	is	challenged	by	a	small	budget,	(about	half	of	what	is	allocated	for	the	forest	
production	sector),	and	this	is	also	the	case	in	Vietnam.	 	
The	SF	assemblage.	We	have	discussed	how	a	national-led	reform	process	does	not	translate	
well	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 	 Indeed,	 community	 forest	 management	 is	 what	 Li	 (2009)	 terms	 an	
‘assemblage’,	where	competing	and	overlapping	 responsibilities,	discourses	and	 interests	among	
provincial	 government,	 district	 government,	 the	 various	 Technical	 Implementing	 Units	 of	 the	
Ministry	 (e.g.	 SF,	Watershed	Management,	Park	management),	different	non-government	actors	
and	local	communities	have	made	the	cohesive	governance	and	management	of	forest	so	difficult.	 	
Changes	 at	 national	 level	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 agencies	 to	manage	 SF,	 as	 occurred	 in	
Indonesia,	 have	 led	 to	 confusion	 and	 insecurity.	 	 Unless	 mandates	 and	 roles	 are	 clarified,	 a	
coordinating	mechanism	is	established	and	funding	allocated	accordingly,	targets	will	likely	not	be	
achieved.																																																									
1	 Interview	results,	2014	
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Despite	the	decentralization	processes	associated	with	SF	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia,	the	State	
has	remained	a	dominant	presence.	The	governmentality	of	SF	can	be	seen	in	two	ways:	firstly,	SF	
is	 perhaps	 not	 so	much	meant	 to	 seriously	 transfer	 authority	 to	 communities,	 but	 to	maintain	
control	over	forests	 in	a	different	manner,	for	example,	through	complex	permitting	applications	
and	reporting	obligations.	Decentralization	also	offers	an	opportunity	 for	States	 to	 transfer	 their	
unresolved	forest	problems	and	financial	deficits,	while	maintaining	central	control	over	valuable	
assets	 and	 resources.	 This	 is	 certainly	 the	 case	 for	Vietnam	 in	 terms	of	 state	 failure	and	budget	
deficits	 in	 forest	management,	 and	 Indonesia	 in	 terms	of	 appeasing	 local	 conflicts.	Hence,	what	
seems	empowerment	of	and	 increased	autonomy	for	and	communities	at	 first	glance,	 is	actually	
driven	by	the	central	state	to	dispose	of	its	wicked	problems	(Arts,	2014).	
Secondly,	SF	is	not	about	increasing	decision-making	power	for	ordinary	people,	but	is	really	
about	shaping	of	the	community	as	environmentally	responsible	subjects	and	the	creation	of	mutual	
consent	 around	 local	 forestry	 problems	 and	 objectives	 (Agarwal	 2005).	 	 Given	 these	 two	
perspectives	and	state	failure	to	transform	SF	as	a	diverse	and	complex	system	of	local	and	nested	
forms	 of	 governance,	 we	 should	 be	 “cautious	 about	 accepting	 too	 optimistic	 or	 too	 naïve	
governance	claims	of	devolution,	autonomy	and	empowerment.”	(Arts	2014).	
6.	Conclusions	
Although	 based	 on	 different	 contexts	 and	 for	 different	 reasons,	 SF	 was	 adopted	 by	 the	
governments	of	Vietnam	and	Indonesia	as	a	government	program	to	achieve	the	multiple	objectives	
of	 improving	 livelihoods,	 empowering	 communities	 and	 improving	 forest	 governance.	 The	
governments	 regulate	 SF	 by	 legislating	multiple	 policies	 and	 regulations	 that	 have	 had	 at	 times	
contradictory	effects	to	their	stated	objectives.	 	 Based	on	a	 literature	review	and	data	from	the	
field,	we	find	that	conflicts	over	resources,	incomplete	allocation	of	rights,	misalignment	between	
formal	SF	rules	and	local	governance	systems,	and	actors	involved	have	rendered	SF	ineffective	in	
general.	 	 	
Several	 interpretations	can	be	 identified.	 	 First	 is	 that	the	government	 itself	has	no	serious	
interest	in	the	implementation	of	SF	as	it	not	only	would	lose	control	over	the	resources,	but	also	
must	undergo	transformational	change.	Old	habits	die	hard	and	institutional	stickiness	and	vested	
interests	is	a	common	problem	(Brockhaus	et	al.,	2014).	 	 Secondly,	either	there	is	a	lack	of	trust,	
or	communities	are	indeed	unwilling	to	manage	forests	on	these	terms.	Local	people	do	not	hesitate	
to	change	their	 livelihood	system	if	they	see	economic	opportunities	(Feintrenie	et	al.,	2010)	but	
incentives	need	to	be	clear.	 	
Thirdly,	empowerment	needs	more	 than	SF,	 it	would	need	 respect	 for	 the	 local	people	and	
structural	 reform	 to	 provide	 clear	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 allowing	 local	 people	 autonomy	 to	
exercise	power.	 	 It	requires	providing	understanding	and	skills	that	allows	local	people	to	govern	
resources.	 	 Equally	important,	it	also	requires	an	understanding	that	the	interlinkages	between	the	
community	 and	 forest	 are	 not	 static,	 but	 an	 adaptive	 and	 dynamic	 practice	 of	 governance	 to	
changing	development,	movements	of	people,	market,	policy	and	environmental	processes.	As	the	
experience	 from	Vietnam	and	 Indonesia	suggest,	SF	 in	 its	current	 forms	fail	 to	meet	up	to	these	
requirements.	 In	 line	with	other	authors	 (Adiwibowo,	2016;	Maryudi,	 2012)	 it	may	be	 that	 SF	 is	
indeed	not	fully	serving	the	interests	of	the	people,	but	perhaps	that	of	the	State.	
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Sosial)	
Ministerial	Decree	No.	P.52/MENHUT-II/2011	on	third	amendments	of	Ministry	of	Forestry	Decree	
No.	P.37/MENHUT-II/2007	on	Community	Forestry	(Hutan	Kemasyarakatan)	
Ministerial	 Decree	 No.	 P.53/MENHUT-II/2011	 on	 second	 amendments	 of	 Ministry	 of	 Forestry	
Decree	No.	P.49/MENHUT-II/2008	on	Village	Forest	(Hutan	Desa)	
Ministerial	Decree	No.	P.55/MENHUT-II/2011	on	procedure	to	request	permits	to	use	non	timber	
products	 in	 planted	 forest	 (tentang	 Tata	 Cara	 Pemohonan	 Izin	 Usaha	 Pemanfaatan	 Hasil	
Hutan	Kayu	pada	Hutan	Tanaman	Rakyat	dalam	Hutan	Tanaman)	
Ministerial	Decree	No.	P.49/MENHUT-II/2008	on	Village	Forest	(Hutan	Desa)	
Forest and Society. Vol. 1(2):78-97, November 2017 97 
	
Presidential	 regulation	 no	 88,	 2017	 on	 solving	 conflicting	 claims	 in	 forest	 areas	 (tentang	
Penyelesaian	Penguasaan	Tanah	dalam	Kawasan	Hutan)	
Law	No	41/1999	dated	30/09/1999	on	Forestry	
Law	No.6/2014	on	Village	(tentang	Desa).	 	
	
